Safety and the Allocation of Costs in Large Accidents by Langlais, Eric
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Safety and the Allocation of Costs in
Large Accidents
Eric Langlais
30. September 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25710/
MPRA Paper No. 25710, posted 9. October 2010 19:13 UTC
Safety and the Allocation of Costs in
Large Accidents
Eric LANGLAIS
September 2010
1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the unilateral accident model in an economy having three
main features: 1/ individuals (both injurers and victims) are Rank Dependant
Expected Utility maximizers, which allows us to capture two important behav-
ioral characteristics in risk, both pessimism (probability transformation) and
risk aversion, which are mainly documented in experimental works; 2/ there
exists an aggregate risk in case of accident which entails monetary losses which
are not perfectly compensable, which seems to t well with the occurrence of
accidents leading to large/catastrophic losses; 3/ nally, tortfeasors have the
opportunity to invest in damages reduction activities having a monetary cost
of e¤ort (hence assuming the perfect susbstitutability between the cost of e¤ort
and wealth) which is a good approximation of the cases where the available
technology enables to monitor more precisely the consequences of the accident
(losses) than the likelihood of the accident. Thus, our framework departs from
previous literature, which considers economies with pure individual risks and
perfectly compensable losses (Arlen (1992), Miceli and Segerson (1995), Shavell
(1982)) and/or contexts in which care reduces the probability of accidents (Nell
and Richter (2003), Gra¤ Zivin, Just and Zilberman (2006)). As in our com-
panion paper (Dari-Mattiacci and Langlais (2009)) we add to the literature on
questions still in debate: e¢ cient risk sharing rules with endogenous transac-
tion costs (Borch (1962), Raviv (1978)); the relationship between safety stan-
dards and wealth (Arlen (1992), Miceli and Segerson (1995), Shavell (1982));
the separation between incentives to prevention, risk sharing and redistributive
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objectives (Shavell (1981, 1982), Kaplow and Shavell (1994, 2000)); the equiva-
lence between, and e¢ ciency of, basic liability rules (Brown (1973), Landes and
Posner (1987), Shavell (1987)).
We characterize the rst best of this economy, both in terms of safety expen-
ditures and risk sharing. Specically, we show that the rst best level of care is
higher than in a risk-neutral economy, reecting the existence of an aggregate
(non diversiable) risk which has to be redistributed among society (and thus,
shared between injurers and victims) hence, the rst best allocation of risk is
such that it is generally not e¢ cient that one party obtains full coverage against
the aggregate risk. Moreover, it appears that socially e¢ cient expenditures in
safety depend on the aggregate wealth of the economy, which is in contrast
with canonical results obtained in the risk neutral/perfectly insurable risk case
(Miceli and Segerson (1995), Shavell (1982)) however the specic sign of this
relationship is shown to be ambiguous. We also show that societys pessimism
has an ambiguous e¤ect on care expenditures; the exception is when societys
preferences are immune against variations of wealth (i.e. under constant mar-
ginal utility), since more pessimism always yields higher safety expenditures.
Turning to the functioning of tort law and basic liability rules, we nd that
both strict liability and negligence are no more equivalent under risk aversion,
although they generally both fail in implementing the rst best. The reason
is that reaching the rst best requires enough instruments in order to transfer
wealth in each states, and to set the care level to the due standard; in contrast,
a liability rule is associated at best to a due care and to a transfer in the
unique event that the accident occurs. As a result, strict liability (but only
with compensatory damages) implements only a second best care level in the
specic sense dened thereafter (when the moral constraint  is taken into
account according to which innocent victims must be fully compensated for the
injuries they su¤er) and this one may be higher than the rst best. Negligence
may fail to induce compliance when the due care is set to its rst best level; it
may also fail to reach the second best level, excepted when full compensatory
damages are considered. The reason is that both the rst best and the second
best care level may represent high safety expenditures, such that the tortfeasors
may have no incentives to adhere such a high standard given the distortion in
risk allocation implied by the negligence rule.
The paper has also a close look at the issue regarding the preferences of the
agents, comparing the standard Expected Utility model and the Rank Depen-
dant Utility model. In particular, we show the conditions under which a RDEU
economy has care expenditures higher than a EU economy. We also give weak
conditions regarding the priors and beliefs on the states of the natures, under
which for any EU economy there always exists a RDEU economy having the
same rst best level of safety activity and the same risk sharing rules. This sug-
gests in contrast to Bigus (2006), Eide (2005) and Teitelbaum (2006) that the
way the state independent risk aversion assumption is modeled may not matter
so much. Also in contrast to these works, our paper insists that the main issue
is the existence of an aggregate risk, since it implies that the choice of the care
level is no more independent of the risk sharing arrangements. However, we
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show that in contrast to a EU economy, the degree of pessimism characterizing
RDEU risk averse individuals a¤ects both the level and sensibility of the e¢ cient
care: pessimism tends to boost safety activities over the risk neutral level, but
may render them less sensible to the probability of accident such results also
contrast with those of Bigus (2006), Eide (2005) and Teitelbaum (2006). As a
result pessimism disturbs both the functioning of strict liability and negligence,
whether insurance liability is available or not. To illustrate with a simple but
signicant example, we show that even when injurers obtain full insurance for
liability, this not lead them to undertake neither the rst best care level, nor
the risk neutral one.
In section 2, we discuss more extensively the motivations of the paper, in
the light of the standard analysis of tort laws, and also with reference to more
recent papers which deal with the issue of societys non neutrality to risk. In
section 3, we present our framework, and characterize the properties of the rst
best for a RDEU economy when an aggregate risk exists. Section 4 discusses
the functioning of liability rules, with and without the existence of insurance
liability. Section 5 concludes.
2 Motivations and backgrounds
The widely used model in the literature on Tort Law (see Shavell (1987), De¤ains
and Langlais (2009) for a survey) is a very stylized situation of a unilateral
accident: one party (one or several victims) is injured by an accident due to
the wrongdoing of a second party (an injurer). The hazard which leads to
the accidental event hurting the victim(s) is an avoidable by-product of the
main productive activity of the injurer, this last one being socially useful. The
injurer has the opportunity to invest in a safety technology (he may undertake
precautions, or care) to reduce the level of expected damage when the accident
occurs. Both individuals are supposed to be risk-neutral: this basic framework
will be labelled a risk-neutral world. In this case, any feasible allocation of risk
(any allocation of the aggregate wealth) is Pareto e¢ cient, and the rst-best
level of care satises (see Calabresi (1970), Diamond (1974a,b), Green (1976)):
 ph0(x^) = 1 (1)
meaning that the risk-neutral or risk-free level of care x^ is set such that the
planner weighs the victims expected benet resulting from the loss reduction
(LHS of the equality) and the marginal cost of care borne by the injurer (RHS).
Remark that Shavell (1982) obtains the same result for the level of care but in
an economy with purely idiosyncratic risks: when there is no aggregate risk to
be shared (i.e. soon as the expected aggregate wealth is constant across the
sates of the world), the issue of the e¢ cient level of safety becomes independent
from the issue of the allocation of risks. It is easy to verify that x^ increases in
p but depends neither on societys aggregate wealth, nor on the distribution of
such wealth among individuals  it only depends on the characteristics of the
technology of prevention available to this economy.
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In other words, this framework ts well situations where specic institutions
specialized in the management of risks are available, while safety activity is
decentralized to private entities; then a complete separation is obtained between
the allocation of risks in the society (among private entities or individuals), the
compensation of losses to the victims of accident, and the design of incentives
to invest in safety. This requires that small, individual, risks only exist in the
economy. But, most accidents regarding industrial plants (chemical, nuclear
and so on ...) are large ones, in the sense that they injure a great number of
victims at the same time, leading to the existence of catastrophic losses1 . In
such contexts, strict liability is widely seen as the most suitable way to govern
highly risky activities (environmentally or healthy dangerous production). The
argument is that strict liability is supposed to induce both e¢ cient care and an
e¢ cient level of the risky activity itself, whereas negligence will lead to a higher
(ine¢ cient) level of output.
Nell and Richter (2003) consider a world of Expected Utility parties having
constant absolute risk aversion. They show that, if insurance markets are im-
perfect, the negligence rule implies a result in terms of risk sharing that should
be preferred. The reason is that highly risky activities typically a¤ect a large
number of individuals, such that strict liability implies a quite unfavorable al-
location of risk. Therefore, the negligence rule turns out to be superior, if a
market relationship between the parties exists, since it incurs less cost of risk.
If there is no market relationship between injurer and victims, no clear result
can be derived.
Gra¤ Zivin and ali (2006) investigates the performance of liability rules in
a sequential model of the bilateral accident case. They nd that an increase in
injurer liability does not necessarily increase safety or e¢ ciency in cases where
the injurer is risk neutral. Complete injurer liability is found to yield Pareto
optimality. When either party is risk averse, an increase in injurer liability may
sometimes reduce safety and e¢ ciency. If the injurer is risk neutral and the
victim is risk averse, Pareto optimality is only achieved by assigning full liability
on the injurer. If the injurer is risk averse and the victim is risk neutral, no
level of injurer liability is optimal. In this case, optimality can only be achieved
through the contractualization of abatement activities.
On the other hand, the standard risk-free world also requires that each party
(the injurer as well as the victim(s)) have the same knowledge and/or perception
of the risk of accident, and that this knowledge is consistent with a Bayesian rep-
resentation (probabilistic sophisticated using Sarin and Wakker (2000)s words).
Several authors have recently relaxed such an assumption2 .
Bigus (2006) discusses the functioning of tort law, when tortfeasors have pref-
erences satisfying the axioms of the Prospect Theory. He nds, to the extend
that high probabilities are under-estimated while low ones are over-estimated,
1Remark that such larges losses are typically cases for injurers judgment proofness (Shavell
(1986))  an injurer is said to be judgment proof if his assets are insu¢ cient to compensate
the harm that he has caused.
2Dari-Mattiacci (2005) and de Geest and Dari-Mattiacci (2005) consider the di¤erent issue
of Courts biases in the determination of liability.
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that the level of care obtained under strict liability is too low as compared to
the e¢ cient one; in contrast, negligence may reach the rst best. Eide (2006)
nds similar results when wrongdoers have preferences corresponding to the
Rank Dependent Expected Utility Theory. That Prospect Theory and Rank De-
pendent Expected Utility Theory yield similar predictions is no surprise: both
rest on the behavioral assumption that individuals distort probabilities in order
to assess the weight of likelihood associated to random events to which they are
faced. Moreover, both may be described in terms of a very similar axiomatic:
Cumulative Prospect Theory suggested by Wakker and Tversky (1993) is a gen-
eralization of both; it states that there exist two paired functions, a probability
function and a utility function on outcomes, dened on the one hand for gains
(positive outcomes) and on the other for losses (negative outcomes). Speci-
cally, the shape of the probability function looks like the one in graph 1. This
one illustrates the restrictions required to explain the typical patterns of be-
havior observed in experimental works, i.e. individuals undertake risk seeking
decisions when they face low probabilities of winning or large probabilities of
loosing, and simultaneously, they follow risk averse behavior when they face
small probabilities of losses or large probabilities of gains (Tversky and Wakker
(1995), Abdellaoui (2000), Stott (2006)). In some sense, such a typical probabil-
ity transformation phenomenon is also observed when people have to assess the
risks of several fatal hazards to which they may be faced during their lifetime
(see Lichtenstein and ali (pages 565-566, 1978) for mortality risks).
In words, what is observed in various contexts including hypothetical choices
(in experimental settings) or e¤ective ones (like insurance coverage, labor supply
and so on) is a tendency to under estimate events associated to a large likelihood
of occurrence, and at the same time to over assess the value of small probability
events.
Graph 1 : A typical probability distorsion function
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Teitelbaum (2007) uses a slightly di¤erent model of the a unilateral accident,
which introduces ambiguity in the knowledge of the probability of accident.
The injurers beliefs are represented by a neo-additive capacity (Chateauneuf
and ali (2003)): the functional representing his preferences is thus dened as
the weighted sum of the best, worst and expected outcomes associated to the
ambiguous prospect he faces. In the two-states model, this implies that the
injurer under estimates the probability of the accidental event3 . Then, Teitel-
baum shows that neither strict liability nor negligence is generally e¢ cient in
the presence of ambiguity. More generally, he nds that the injurers level of
care decreases (increases) with ambiguity if he is optimistic (pessimistic) and
decreases (increases) with his degree of optimism (pessimism). However, due to
the inuence of pessimism, his results suggest once more that negligence may
be superior to strict liability in the unilateral accident context.
A common feature of these three papers is that they rest on the common-
place denition of the rst best e¢ cient, level of care this last one only depends
on the characteristics of the technology of safety which is available in the econ-
omy (see condition (1)). In other words, although individuals (tortfeasors, but
also maybe, victims) are assumed to have a subjective assessment of the risk of
3This kind of assumption allows to solve the Ellsberg paradox. But its main weakness is
that, when the ambiguity vanishes the decision context becomes risky, i.e. when the knowledge
of the true probability is perfect, the model reduces to the Expected Utility one: the individual
does not distort the probability of accident. Typically, there exit cumulative evidence that this
is not true (see Allaiss paradox ): people distort objectively known probabilities. A classical
presentation is Machina (1987).
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accident or even more, an ambiguous information, the social planner is sup-
posed to ignore the existence of such di¢ culties when it proceeds to the choice
of the rst best care. In the view of a benevolent planner, this may be uneasy
to justify. Typically, the existence of individual biases in risks perception, or
the existence of ambiguity in information, are a major concern and drawback
for the implementation of public policies in the area of safety, health and/or
environment regulations4 . Moreover, both are a source of major imperfections
in nancial as well as insurance markets. For example, it is now well docu-
mented that both the demand and the supply sides in insurance markets are
so sensible to them (Hogarth and Kunreuther (1985, 1989), Kunreuther and ali
(1993, 1995)) that they may result in severe market failure in insurance lines.
As a result, insurance coverage is available but for high premia, and indemnity
schedules are characterized by xed reimbursements, or deductibles on small
losses and caps and upper limits on large ones, implying that the demand side
is constrained and full insurance is not possible5 . The existence of imperfect
insurance markets which provides individuals with limited opportunity of risk
exchanges, becomes a main concern for the control of risky activities.
Hence, the analysis of prevention and the functioning of tort laws (liability
rules) has to be developed with reference to situations where, due to ambiguous
information and/or biases in risk perception, there exist only limited opportu-
nities to reallocate risks in the economy thus, the issue of risk sharing and the
level of safety in the economy are not more perfectly separable, but they have
in contrast to be jointly solved. This is the issue of the present paper, when
accidents only represent monetary losses for the victims.
3 E¢ cient risk sharing rules and safety activity
3.1 A simple model
We consider a simple society with two di¤erent groups of identical individuals,
injurers and victims, who are initially endowed with wealth w = w0 and y = y0,
respectively6 . Note that W0 = w0 + y0 represents societys initial aggregate
wealth henceforth simply societys wealth. An injurers activity may result
in an accident with an exogenous probability p > 0; if an accident occurs, a
victim su¤ers a pecuniary loss h(x), which depends on the injurers pecuniary
investment in care x, with h0(x) < 0, h00(x) > 0, h(0) = H > 0, and h0(1)! 0.
Note that we assume that it is always protable both for the injurer and for
society that the injurer undertakes such an activity. However, our analysis does
not address questions concerning the optimal level of activity.
4See Viscusi and ali (2000) for empirical/practical discussions, and Etner and ali (2007),
Jeleva and Rossignol (2009) and Salanié and Treich (2009) for more formal arguments
5Carlier and ali (2003) provide an analysis of the design of e¢ cient insurance contracts
when insurees are Choquet Expected Utility maximizers.
6This case with only two individuals is for expositional convenience. The generalisation
for N agents (victims and/or injurers) is straightforward.
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We employ a RDEU representation of individualspreferences (see appendix
for a general presentation). We assume that both have the same probability
transformation function, denoted ' : [0; 1]  [0; 1] ! [0; 1] unique, continuous,
increasing and convex in p, with '(0) = 0 and '(1) = 1. In contrast, we
assume that they are characterized by a specic utility index; u (wi) and v (yi)
will denote the injurers and the victims utility in state i, which are functions
of their respective wealth, with u
0
; v
0
> 0 and u
00
; v
00  0 and i = b in the
accident state (the badstate) and i = g in the no-accident state (the good
state). Note that according to the assumption made on the various functions ('
convex and u and v are both concave), both individuals are risk averse in the
strong sense, i.e. to second dominance order shifts in risk (Chew, Karni and
Sa¤ra (1987)).
Note that as compared to the shape of the probability transformation in
graph 1, we focus on the case where individuals always distort probabilities in
a pessimistic way, i.e. '(p) < p 8p 2]0; 1[. The main consequence of such an
assumption is that they have a subjective assessment of the likelihood of acci-
dent which is larger than the true (objective, as given by statistical estimates)
probability: p < 1  '(1  p).
We will rst consider the problem of a benevolent social planner, which has
to choose a certain level of care x and a certain allocation of risk (wb; wg; yb; yg).
The planners objective is to maximize social welfare, dened as follows:
SW =

(1  '(1  p)) [u(wb) + v(yb)] + '(1  p) [u(wg) + v(yg)] if wb < wg; yb < yg
'(p) [u(wb) + v(yb)] + (1  '(p)) [u(wg) + v(yg)] if wb > wg; yb > yg
(2)
subject to the resource constraints wb+yb = w0+y0 h(x) x, in the bad state,
and wg + yg = w0 + y0   x, in the good state. Note that in our analysis, we do
not introduce the usual aggregate constraint: p(wb + yb) + (1   p)(wg + yg) =
w0 + y0   ph(x)   x: this one ts typically a situation with pure idiosyncratic
risks (thus, allowing full mutualization), for which the aggregate wealth of the
economy is constant over the states of the world (i.e. the constant probability
of accident is close to the proportion on the population injured in each state).
In such a world, it is well known (Magill and Quinzii (1996)) that (complete)
contingent markets may be replaced by a perfect insurance market which pays
full insurance to all individuals, and charges a premium equal to the expected
indemnity. In contrast, we focus on a situation where there is an aggregate risk,
which is not fully diversiable.
3.2 A general characterization of the rst-best
Basically, our model illustrates that in situations where an aggregate risk exists,
the separation between the allocation of risk and care does not hold; thus the
rst best is characterized by a certain level of care x and a certain sharing of the
aggregate risk in each state (wb; wg; yb; yg) which maximize (2). In this section,
we examine the characteristics of the rst best.
Accidents reduce the aggregate wealth of society. However, this loss can in
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principle be allocated in many di¤erent ways between the parties involved. The
following proposition puts some restrictions on such feasible allocations of risk.
Proposition 1 The rst-best allocation of risk [(wb; wg) ; (yb; yg)] is comonotonic:
wb  wg and yb  yg, and satises Borchs conditions, u0(wb) = v0(yb) and
u0(wg) = v0(yg).
Proof. Assume rst that there exists some values of x > 0 such that h(x)+
x < H: Assume now that the feasible allocation [(wb; wg) ; (yb; yg)] with wb  wg
and simultaneously yb  yg; associated to a care level x, is Pareto optimal.
Now for the same level of care, dene an alternative feasible allocation
[( ~wb; ~wg) ; (~yb; ~yg)] where ~wb  ~wg and simultaneously ~yb = ~yg; such that:
~wb = wb + (1  p)(yb   yg)
~wg = wg   p(yb   yg)
~yb = pyb + (1  p)yg = ~yg
~wb + ~yb = wb + yb
~wg + ~yg = wg + yg
By denition, both individuals obtain the same expected individual wealth
irrespective of the allocation we choose, since: p~yb+ (1  p)~yg = pyb+ (1  p)yg
for the victim and p ~wb + (1  p) ~wg = pwb + (1  p)wg for the injurer.
On the other hand, ( ~wb; ~wg) is less spread than (wb; wg) in the sense of the
second stochastic dominance order, since given that for the same probabilities
(p; 1  p) we have the following order for injurers wealth in the di¤erent states:
wb < ~wb  ~wg < wg; (~yb; ~yg) is also less spread than (yb; yg) since we have:
yb > ~yb = ~yg > yg. Recall that, by assumption, both individuals are risk
averse to second dominance order shifts in risk. Thus [( ~wb; ~wg) ; (~yb; ~yg)] Pareto
dominates [(wb; wg) ; (yb; yg)]; hence a contradiction.
Now, dene two real numbers b and g as the shadow prices of the aggre-
gate resource constraints of society. The problem of the social planner is now
equivalent to the maximization of:
(1  '(1  p)) [u(wb) + v(yb)] + '(1  p) [u(wg) + v(yg)]
under the resources constraints. When an interior solution exists, then it cor-
responds to a vector (x;wb; wg; yb; yg) which satises the set of the following
conditions:
 bh0(x)  (g + b) = 0 (3)
(1  '(1  p))u0(wb)  b = 0 (4)
'(1  p)u0(wg)  g = 0 (5)
(1  '(1  p))v0(yb)  b = 0 (6)
'(1  p)v0(yg)  g = 0 (7)
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Conditions (4) to (7) dene the rule that should be used by the planner to
implement a rst best allocation of risk. Using (4) and (6) together, and (5)
and (7) together, we obtain Borchs conditions:
u0(wb) = v0(yb), with wb + yb = w0 + y0   x  h(x)
u0(wg) = v0(yg), with wg + yg = w0 + y0   x
which leads to:
v0(yg)
v0(yb)
=
u0(wg)
u0(wb)
(8)
Now summing over conditions (4) to (7) yields:
b + g = (1  '(1  p))v0(yb) + '(1  p)v0(yg)
Substituting in (3) and rearranging, we obtain that the rst-best level of care
satises the condition:
 (1  '(1  p))h0(x) + '(1  p)

1  v
0(yg)
v0(yb)

= 1 (9)
i.e. the e¢ cient level of care x is such that the planner weighs the victims
subjective expected benet coming from the loss reduction (rst term in the
LHS of equality) adjusted now by a measure of the risk (second term in the
LHS) and the marginal cost of care borne by the injurer (RHS). Condition (9)
is equivalent to:
h0(x) + 1 =   ' (1  p)
1  '(1  p)
v0(yg)
v0(yb)
(10)
which allows to show that at optimum: h0(x)+1 < 0 (since the RHS is negative):
i.e. the total cost of accident (damage to the victim + cost of care) is decreasing
at optimum.
Finally, second order conditions require the following inequality to hold:
h00(x)
1 + h0(x)
(tug + t
v
g) +
tug + t
v
g
tub + t
v
b
(1 + h0(x))  1 < 0
where: tvg =   v
0(yg)
v00(yg)
; tvb =   v
0(yb)
v00(yb)
; tug =   u
0(wg)
u00(wg)
; tub =   u
0(wb)
u00(wb)
denote the
inverse of the indexes of risk aversion7 for the victim and the injurer, evaluated
7Our terminology is quite abusive. In the RDEU model, the local characterization of risk
aversion (or its local measure à la Arrow-Pratt) do not necessarily require the concavity of the
utility index (see Chateauneuf and Cohen (1993), Cohen (1995) and Courtault and Gayant
(1998)). In the sense of Segal and Spivak (1990), the RDEU model displays rst order risk
aversion, due to the convexity of '; in contrast, the index  u00
u0 corresponds to second order
risk aversion (this is a second order term) which is specic to the Expected Utility model.
More generally, since Allais it is a matter of debate in decision theory (see Bouyssou and
Vansnick (1990)) that the concavity of the utility index represents both the risk aversion
assumption (a behavior under risk) and the hypothesis of the decreasing marginal utility of a
wealth (a feature of preferences with respect to certain outcomes). However, in order to keep
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for each state; given the various conditions made on preferences and on the
technology of safety, this last inequality is obviously satised.
In the literature on risk sharing, the property of comonotonicity is also
termed the Mutuality Principle. Its rst statements are due to Borch (1962)
and Arrow (1964) in the specic case of insurance arrangements (including
the administrative costs of insurance contracts). Landsberger and Meilijson
(1994), and Chateauneuf, Dana and Tallon (2000) provide additional insights
for economies without transaction costs (expenditures needed for the sharing
of aggregate resources of society) but when individuals are Non Bayesian (Non
Expected Utility) maximizers. Thus our result shows that the principle also
applies when costly prevention activities are considered. Note, however, that
to the extent that we consider only an interior solution, not all comonotonic
allocations are e¢ cient  but only those comonotonic allocations that satisfy
Borchs conditions. Such conditions yield that an e¢ cient allocation of risk is
reached when, in each state, the aggregate social wealth is shared so that the
injurers marginal utility of wealth equals the victims marginal utility of wealth.
Since conditions (1) and (9) are quite di¤erent generally speaking (hence
the two level of care are di¤erent), an important question arises here: how
risk aversion a¤ects the e¢ cient level of care? In our companion paper (Dari-
Mattiacci and Langlais (2009)) we proved that when accidents entail some non
monetary losses (which are not insurable), there is no simple answer to such
question: state-dependent risk aversion may lead to a higher or a lower level of
care than in a risk neutral world. In contrast, our result regarding the inuence
of risk aversion per se is non ambiguous here:
Proposition 2 The rst-best level of care when society is risk averse is greater
than when society is risk-neutral.
Proof. Risk neutrality under the RDEU representation of preferences re-
quires that '(p) = p 8p and at the same time v00(y) = u00(w) = 0 8y; w. Now,
note that according to proposition 1: yg  yb; thus, the concavity of v implies
v0(yg)  v0(yb), and thus, '(1   p)

1  v0(yg)v0(yb)

> 0 at optimum. Moreover,
since by convexity of ' we have: '(1   p) < 1   p ) 1   '(1   p) > p, it
comes that  (1 '(1 p))h0(x) >  ph0(x). As a result, the LHS in (9) satises
 (1 '(1 p))h0(x)+'(1 p)

1  v0(yg)v0(yb)

>  ph0(x), which allows to compare
(1) and (9). Given that by convexity of h, the LHS in (9) decreases in x, we
obtain x > x^.
easier the interpretation if the results, we make use here of the widely spread terminology,
assuming that the ratio  u00
u0 is driving the behavior under risk with respect to the variation of
his wealth. Courtault and Gayant (1998) suggest that in the RDEU model, the ratio  u00
u0 is
a measure of spreading risk aversion : the decrease of marginal utility induces mechanically
a gap between the certainty equivalent of a random variable and its expectation (Courtault
and Gayant (p 212, 1998)) .
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The condition (9) means that the optimal level of care x minimizes the cost
of accident adjusted for the risk; this implies that the rst-best level of care x
for a RDEU utility-based economy is greater than the rst-best level of care x^
in a risk-neutral economy.
Despite we obtain a di¤erent result in our companion paper (Dari-Mattiacci
and Langlais (2009)), it is important to note that other general features of the
rst best also hold here, which are in contrast to the risk-free world:
- in relation to the partieswealth, neither the injurer nor the victim obtains
full insurance, that is, neither of them obtains the same wealth in the bad state
as in the good state; moreover, in relation to the partiesutility, neither the
injurer nor the victim is protected against adverse changes in his utility, that is
the utility is necessarily less in the bad state than in the good state.
- care expenditures are a cost both in the good state and in the bad state,
while reducing the magnitude of the loss in the bad state only. Thus, care entails
an implicit transfer from the good state to the bad state, such that at optimum
the total cost in case of accident (care + damage) decreases.
- the choice of the level of care is no longer independent from the choice
of the allocation of risk, since the choice of the level of care implies a wealth
e¤ect through the cost of care and the accident loss. Such wealth e¤ects cannot
be undone by insurance or redistribution since, as a result of the accident,
individuals nd themselves in an inferior state.
The following corollary claries the role of risk-aversion in determining the
rst-best level of care, when accidents yield only monetary losses.
Corollary 3 If at least one of the parties is risk-neutral then the rst-best level
of care is the same as in the risk-neutral world, and any feasible allocation
[(wb; wg) ; (yb; yg)] providing full insurance to the victim (yb = yg) is rst best
e¢ cient.
Proof. Assume that the injurer is risk neutral: this implies that he has
the identity function as a probability transformation '(p) = p, and a constant
marginal utility for wealth: u0(wg) = constant = u0(wb); in this case, any
e¢ cient allocation of risk fully insures the risk averse individual; thus, optimal
care is independent from risk sharing and satises condition (1). The same
result applies by symmetry when the victim is risk-neutral.
The logic of this result is that the risk-neutral party can indemnify the risk-
averse party, countering the e¤ect of risk aversion. Thus, the relevant factors
determining the level of care are the same as in a risk-free or risk neutral world.
Finally, it is also worth to highlight the specic role of the pessimistic trans-
formation of probability captured by the RDEU representation of preferences.
Remark that assuming a constant marginal utility in wealth for both individ-
uals, but maintaining the assumption that both are pessimistic ('(p) convex
8p 2 [0; 1]), we obtain the specic case of the RDEU model termed as the Dual
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Theory suggested by Yaari (1987). Interestingly, the convexity of ' is equiv-
alent to the risk aversion assumption (Roël (1987), Yaari (1987)). A major
implication of this assumption is the following:
Corollary 4 If both parties have identical preferences satisfying the axiomatic
of the Dual Theory, any comonotonic allocation of wealth is rst best e¢ cient,
and the optimal level of care is larger than in the risk-neutral case. Moreover,
it increases with the societys pessimism.
Proof. The allocation of risk (individual wealths) is now undetermined 
since both are immune against marginal changes in wealth and both have the
same pessimistic assessment of the probability of accident, this implies that
any comonotonic allocation of the aggregate wealth (aggregate risk) may be
implemented. Using that v0(yg) = constant = v0(yb), this implies that according
to (9) the e¢ cient care level satises now:
 (1  '(1  p))h0(x') = 1
Given that 1  '(1  p) > p, then it is still true that: x' > x^.
Now, consider two di¤erent economies, characterized respectively by the
pessimistic transformations ' and  ; assume that  is a positive and convex
transformation of ': by denition (Roël (1987) and Yaari (1987)),  is more
pessimistic than ' (and thus, more risk averse in the sense of the Dual Theory);
thus, for all p 2 [0; 1], we have: '(p) >  (p). Finally, this implies that the
society with  has a care level which satises:
 (1   (1  p))h0(x ) = 1
Since 1  '(1  p) < 1   (1  p), we obtain that: x' < x .
Remark that, under the assumption that a benevolent planner acts for so-
ciety8 , we obtain a result which is di¤erent as compared to Bigus (2006), Eide
(2005), or Teitelbaum (2007), in several respects. Given that we consider a case
with aggregate risk, our characterization of the rst best care yields a level di¤er-
ent than in the risk-free case (1). Moreover, it is also worth noticing that under
our RDEU representation of preferences, due to the pessimism of individuals,
our rst best level of care is higher than in the standard risk neutral case. It is
also higher than under the alternative characterization of pessimism introduced
by Teitelbaum (2007). The basic reason is that under the representation based
on a neo additive-additive capacity, the perceived (ambiguous and subjective)
likelihood of accident is smaller than the true probability thus, the benets
of the prevention are under estimated; in contrast, under the RDEU represen-
tation with a pessimistic transformation function, the subjective believe on the
8Etner and ali (2007) elaborate on the problem of voluntary contributions to environment;
they consider a case of a planner endowed with its own preferences, represented by a probability
transformation function which is di¤erent as compared to the citizensone.
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likelihood of accident is larger than the true probability: thus, the benets of
prevention are over estimated as compared to the expected benets. Finally, as
society is more pessimistic, the care level moves away from the risk neutral one
while it becomes closer under the neo additive capacity representation.
However, note that under the general RDEU representation (i.e. assum-
ing ' convex and u concave), an increase in societys pessimism will have an
ambiguous e¤ect on care. To see this, let us assume once more an economy
with the same features (identical individuals) as before, excepted the proba-
bility transformation which is now described by the function  . It satises the
same general assumptions as ', but for all p 2 [0; 1], we have: '(p) >  (p).
Then, it corresponds to an e¢ cient level of care x which saties now:
 (1   (1  p))h0(x) +  (1  p)

1  v
0(yg)
v0(yb)

= 1
to be compared to (9). As far as  (p) < p for all p 2 [0; 1], it comes that
1   (1  p) > 1  '(1  p) but  (1  p) < '(1  p). This implies that we may
obtain x ? x.
3.3 Properties of the rst best: comparative statics
The main consequence of our previous ndings is that the choice of an e¢ cient
level of safety (prevention activity) is not independent of the choice of the e¢ -
cient allocation of risk (allocation of the consequences of the accidents). Both
are inter-related, once we recognize the existence of the aggregate risk, and the
limited opportunities to reallocate it among the society. We study here some
more specic properties of the social optimum: how it relates to the aggregate
wealth and to the occurrence of accidents9 .
3.3.1 The role of societys wealth
From an intuitive (naïve ?) point of view, it seems obvious that the rst-best
level of care increases when societys wealth increases thus rich societies would
have the opportunity to invest more in safety activities than poorer ones, and be
better o¤ this way since the consequences of accidents (damages) are reduced.
The next result shows that things are less clear that it seems at rst glance:
Proposition 5 Consider any rst best in terms of safety activity and risk shar-
ing. Then:
i) If both individuals have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), then the
rst-best level of care is independent from societys wealth.
ii) If both individuals have decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), then
the rst-best level of care decreases in societys wealth.
9The reader will observe that our results regarding the comparative statics of care having
the properties of a self-insurance activity are quite simple, and generally, easy to sign. This
is in contrast to the analysis of self-protection activities, which generally yields ambiguous
results or much more uneasy to interprete; see the literature in the individual context: Chiu
(2000), Jullien and ali (1999), Lee (1998, 2005), Sweeney and Beard (1992).
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iii) If both individuals have increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA), then
the rst-best level of care increases in societys wealth.
Proof. Societys initial wealth is W0 = w0 + y0. Given that according to
the resources constraints, we have:
@yb
@W0
+
@wb
@W0
= 1  (1 + h0(x)) @x
@W0
@yg
@W0
+
@wg
@W0
= 1  @x
@W0
the impact of an increase in W0 on the individual endowments (risk sharing
rules) may be obtained by rst totally di¤erentiating Borchs conditions, to
obtain:
u00(wb)
@wb
@W0
= v00(yb)
@yb
@W0
) @yb
@W0
=
tvb
tub
@wb
@W0
u00(wg)
@wg
@W0
= v00(yg)
@yg
@W0
) @yg
@W0
=
tvg
tug
@wg
@W0
and substituting the results of the derivation of the constraints, we obtain:
@yb
@W0
=
tvb
tub + t
v
b

1  (1 + h0(x)) @x

@W0

(11)
@yg
@W0
=
tvg
tug + t
v
g

1  @x

@W0

(12)
Then, di¤erentiating condition (9) and rearranging, we obtain:
h00(x)
1 + h0(x)
@x
@W0
=
1
tvb
@yb
@W0
  1
tvg
@yg
@W0
(13)
After substituting (11) and (12) into (13), we have:
@x
@W0
=
tug+t
v
g
tub+t
v
b
  1
h00(x)
1+h0(x) (t
u
g + t
v
g) +
tug+t
v
g
tub+t
v
b
(h0(x) + 1)  1
(14)
where: tvg =   v
0(yg)
v00(yg)
; tvb =   v
0(yb)
v00(yb)
; tug =   u
0(wg)
u00(wg)
; tub =   u
0(wb)
u00(wb)
have been
dened in the proof of proposition 1. Given that according to the second order
condition associated to the rst best the denominator has a negative sign, we
have:
sign
@x
@W0
= sign

1  t
u
g + t
v
g
tub + t
v
b

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Now, remember that according to the Mutuality Principle, the individual en-
dowments satisfy wb  wg and yb  yg; hence, the individual indexes of toler-
ance may be ranked according to the property of the corresponding indexes of
absolute risk aversion. Thus, by denition we have10 :
- under CARA:  v00(yg)v0(yg) =  
v00(yb)
v0(yb)
and  u00(wg)u0(wg) =  
u00(wb)
u0(wb)
; this implies:
tvg = t
v
b and t
u
g = t
u
b )
tug+t
v
g
tub+t
v
b
= 1) @x@W0 = 0;
- under DARA:  v00(yg)v0(yg) <  
v00(yb)
v0(yb)
and  u00(wg)u0(wg) <  
u00(wb)
u0(wb)
; this implies
now tvg  tvb and tug  tub )
tug+t
v
g
tub+t
v
b
> 1) @x@W0 < 0;
- under IARA:  v00(yg)v0(yg) >  
v00(yb)
v0(yb)
and  u00(wg)u0(wg) >  
u00(wb)
u0(wb)
; nally, this
implies tvg  tvb and tug  tub )
tug+t
v
g
tub+t
v
b
< 1) @x@W0 > 0:
Hence the results.
Note that we obtain a result which is in line with more commonplace analysis
pertaining to insurance economics or more generally to decision making under
risk, since it is well known in such literatures that wealth e¤ects are governed at
the individual level through the dependence of the index of risk aversion to the
individual wealth. This property extends here to (e¢ cient) collective decisions:
the rst-best level of care depends on societys wealth; however, the direction
of this relation in turn depends on societys risk aversion. Thus, for richer
societies it might be optimal to take more or less care than poorer societies. The
intuitive explanation is as follows. As we previously observed, the technology
of care allows to implement an implicit transfer of wealth from the good state
to the bad state in such a risk averse and state-dependant world. According
to proposition 5, wealth should be transferred to the state where (initially)
societys risk aversion is the smaller; thus, increasing care is optimal if societys
risk aversion is smaller in the bad state and vice versa, reversing the transfer,
when the opposite applies.
Note that since Borch (1962), it is more usual in the literature on risk shar-
ing to describe wealth e¤ects in terms of absolute tolerance towards risk rather
than in terms of absolute risk aversion. Remark that the interpretation in terms
of risk aversion is specically more relevant, but gives only a su¢ cient condi-
tion  in contrast, the interpretation relating on individual tolerance indexes
would be more troublesome. To see this, let us denote Ti the aggregate index of
risk tolerance and Ai the aggregate index of risk aversion in any state i; then
straightforward manipulations show that we have: Ti=Ai = tui  tvi . In words
although at the individual level, risk aversion and risk tolerance are inversely
related, in contrast at the aggregate level, things are less clear. This explains
that for a society to display more risk tolerance in a state, a su¢ cient (but not
necessary) condition is that all individuals be less risk averse in that state.
10See footnote 7.
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Proposition 6 Any shift in the initial distribution of wealth between agents,
although the aggregate wealth stays constant, has no e¤ect on the e¢ cient level
of care, and no e¤ect on the sharing of risk.
Proof. Consider two economies di¤ering only with regards to the dis-
tribution of individual wealths, namely: (w0; y0) and (w00; y
0
0) but such that
w0 + y0 = W0 = w
0
0 + y
0
0. The rst best for both economies also satises (9)-
(10). Hence, they must have the same e¢ cient expenditure in care, and must
adopt the same risk sharing rules.
In words, purely redistributive changes in individuals initial wealth that
keep the initial aggregate wealth constant do not a¤ect neither care, nor the
e¢ cient allocation of risk.
On the other hand, it is obvious that the individual rst best endowments
(wb; yb; wg; yg) increase withW0: this is a straightforward result of theMutuality
Principle. The main point is: whom of both individuals should benet more
of this increase in societys wealth? Anticipating on the discussion regarding
the implementation of liability rules, the question may be framed as follows: as
society becomes richer, is it e¢ cient that rms liability in the accident increases
in the sense that the rm should borne a higher proportion of the total cost
of the accident? The next proposition yields some mild conclusions:
Proposition 7 Consider any rst best in terms of safety activity and risk shar-
ing. Then, the injurer must benet more (respectively less) than the victim of
an increase in the social wealth if he is less (respectively more) risk averse than
the victim.
Proof. In the proof of proposition 5, it has been shown that in each state
there exists a redistributive e¤ect, since by Borchs conditions, we also have the
following relationships:
@yb
@W0
=
tvb
tub
@wb
@W0
=

 u00(wb)u0(wb)


 v00(yb)v0(yb)
 @wb
@W0
@yg
@W0
=
tvg
tug
@wg
@W0
=

 u00(wg)u0(wg)


 v00(yg)v0(yg)
 @wg
@W0
This means that the way the sharing of both the cost of the accident and the
cost of care depends on the ratio of the victims tolerance to risk to the one of
the injurer  or equivalently, it depends on the ratio of the victims absolute
risk aversion index to the one of the injurer. When the society becomes reacher
it may be socially e¢ cient that the injurers allocation (wb; wg) increases more
than the victims one (yb; yg) yielding to a situation where the victim bears an
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increasing share of the total cost of the accident: this is typically what should
occur when the victims index of absolute risk aversion is smaller than the
injurers one in both states:

 v00(ys)v0(ys)

<

 u00(ws)u0(ws)

for s = b; g. In words, the
liability of the injurer decreases in such a case. But under the reverse conditions,
it is socially e¢ cient that the victim bears a decreasing share of the total cost
of the accident such that the liability of the injurer increases in such a case.
Note that this result may appear as surprising, regarding considerations of
fairness. However, the view at hand focuses on the issue of e¢ ciency, and is
not explicit regarding the specic organizations or institutions which may be
adopted to implement the rst best. The characterization of this last one is
obtain in a general (utilitarian) context: the cost of prevention and investments
in safety when these ones are interrelated to socially valuable activities, must
be collectively spread. In this sense, socially e¢ cient level of care must be
set regarding both technological constraints as those coming from the available
technologies of prevention, and the willingness to pay for safety of the population
which depends on their preferences under risk. The argument is funded on the
case where the planner has a su¢ cient number of instruments, and enough
degree of freedom in order to implement any redistribution of costs between
parties which is seen as desirable. Hence, irrespective of the specic institutions
which may be created to reach it, the rst best is always attainable.
3.3.2 The inuence of the probability of accidents
The second crucial parameter of the model is the baseline risk, which is repre-
sented by the probability of accident p. An increase in p represents an increase
in risk borne by the society, in the sense of the First Stochastic Dominance 
the new distribution of the fatal event puts more weight of likelihood on the
worst state and is also more unfavorable in expected terms (the expected dam-
age increases), all else held equal. The issue is: what is the impact on the level
of care, and on the allocation of the various costs of the accident among the
society? We prove the following results:
Proposition 8 An increase in the probability of accidents leads to an increase
in the rst-best level of care, an increase in both individualswealth in the bad
state, and a decrease in both individualswealth in the good state.
Proof. Given that @yb@p +
@wb
@p =  (1 + h0(x))@x

@p and
@yg
@p +
@wg
@p =  @x

@p ;
the impact on the risk sharing rules of any increase in p may be obtain rst
totally di¤erentiating Borchs conditions to obtain:
u00(wb)
@wb
@p
= v00(yb)
@yb
@p
) @yb
@p
=
tvb
tub
@wb
@p
u00(wg)
@wg
@p
= v00(yg)
@yg
@p
) @yg
@p
=
tvg
tug
@wg
@p
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and once more substituting the constraints we obtain:
@yb
@p =   t
v
b
tub+t
v
b
(1 + h0(x))@x

@p
@yg
@p =  
tvg
tug+t
v
g
@x
@p
9=; (15)
Then, di¤erentiating condition (9) and rearranging, we obtain:
h00(x)
1 + h0(x)
@x
@p
  1
tvb
@yb
@p
+
1
tvg
@yg
@p
=   '
0(1  p)
(1  '(1  p))'(1  p) (16)
Substituting (15) in (16) gives:
@x
@p
=  

'0(1 p)
(1 '(1 p))'(1 p)

  tug + tvg
h00(x)
1+h0(x) (t
u
g + t
v
g) +
tug+t
v
g
tub+t
v
b
(1 + h0(x))  1
> 0 (17)
Coming back to (15) and remembering that at optimum we must have  (1+
h0(x)) > 0, it comes that @yb@p > 0 and
@yg
@p < 0.
The intuition for this result is as follows: an increase in p implies that the
bad state becomes relatively more probable than the good state. Thus, it is
optimal to transfer some wealth from the good to the bad state. This result
can be achieved indirectly, by increasing the level of care, as we have already
remarked. More specically, we have shown (see (10)) that the total accident
cost decreases at the rst-best level of care. As a result, when care increases,
the total wealth in the bad state increases, while obviously the total wealth in
the good state decreases due to the investment in care. Due to the mutuality
principle, since society is reacher in the bad state, so will be both individuals,
and vice versa in the good state.
3.4 Expected Utility versus Rank Dependent Expected
Utility individuals
In this paragraph, we compare our situation with risk averse RDEU individuals
to a society with risk averse Expected Utility individuals  in this last one,
'(p) = p 8p 2 [0; 1]; moreover, the injurers and the victims utility are still
described by u and v. As a result, we can apply propositions 1 to 7 for the EU
economy. The main change is coming from the level of care in the EU economy,
which may be characterized for example through the analogue to condition (10):
h0(x) + 1 =  1  p
p
v0(yg)
v0(yb)
(18)
Then, the fundamental result is the following:
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Proposition 9 Any feasible allocation of risk (wb; wg; yb; yg) is rst best e¢ -
cient in the EU economy if and only if it is rst best e¢ cient in the RDEU
economy. However, the rst best level of care is higher in the RDEU economy
than in the EU one.
Proof. A formal proof according to which a EU economy (with agents
having the same probability distribution over the states) and a RDEU econ-
omy (agents having the same probability transformation function and the same
probability distribution over the states) have the same set of Pareto e¢ cient
allocations of wealth may be found in Chateauneuf, Dana and Tallon (2000,
proposition 3.1, corollary 3.2 and proposition 4.2) for an economy without care.
It is straightforward that the result extents to economies with care, as shown
in the proof of proposition 1. Thus, let us simply consider the characterization
of the e¢ cient care level. Comparing (8) and (18), it is clear that by convexity
of ' we have '(1  p) < 1  p and 11 '(1 p) < 1p implying that p1 p > 1 '(1 p)'(1 p)
which is equivalent to   p1 p <   1 '(1 p)'(1 p) . Thus, comparing (8) and (18) the
LHS h0(x) + 1 increases with x we obtain that the Pareto e¢ cient levels of
care satisfy: x < x.
Notice that (p; 1   p) is a public information in both society. Proposition
8 means that, as far as individuals have the same probability transformation,
their pessimism does not alter the e¢ cient risk sharing principles but it gives
additional reasons for safety activities. More generally, it is well known for EU
economies without care, and where individuals have identical priors over the
states of nature, that the set of Pareto Optimal allocations of risk is independent
of the priors (Chateauneuf and ali (2000), Magill and Quinzii (1996)). This
implies that we also have:
Proposition 10 Consider a EU economy where the injurers and the victims
utility are described by u and v, both agents having the same probability dis-
tribution over the states (q; 1   q); consider a RDEU economy where the in-
jurers and the victims utility are described by u and v, both agents having the
same probability transformation function ' and the same probability distribu-
tion over the states (p; 1 p). Assuming q1 q = 1 '(1 p)'(1 p) , any feasible allocation
(x;wb; wg; yb; yg) is rst best e¢ cient in the EU economy if and only if it is rst
best e¢ cient in the RDEU economy.
This last proposition also means the following: consider two EU economies
where agents are identical (same preferences, same aggregate wealth and initial
endowments) excepted that in the rst one the probability distribution is (q; 1 
q), while in the second one the probability distribution is (1 '(1 p); '(1 p));
then the set of PO allocation of risk is identical as far as q = 1  '(1  p) and
1   q = '(1   p). The result generalizes to economies with prevention activ-
ity, implying once more that: x = x, the level of care is the same in both
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economies. As a result, the specic assumption regarding the representation of
state-independent preferences may not matter so much: for any RDEU repre-
sentation, there always exists an EU representation characterized by the same
e¢ cient allocation of risk and the same rst-best level of risk reduction activity.
However, both economies may display some specicity. Note rst that it is
straightforward to verify that both share the same sensitivity to wealth e¤ects
((14) also apply in EU economy) all else held equal. In contrast, using (17) and
setting '(p) = p 8p 2]0; 1[, it comes that the risk sensitivity in a EU economy
veries:
@xEU
@p
=  
tug+t
v
g
p(1 p)
h00(xEU )
1+h0(xEU ) (t
u
g + t
v
g) +
tug+t
v
g
tub+t
v
b
(1 + h0(xEU ))  1
> 0
Hence, the sensitivity of care to the probability of accident may be higher or
smaller in the RDEU economy then in the EU economy. To see this, note that
by convexity of ', it comes that '0(1  p) > '(1 p)1 p , '
0(1 p)
'(1 p) >
1
1 p ; but given
that 1 '(1 p) > p, 11 '(1 p) < 1p , we obtain that '
0(1 p)
'(1 p)
1
1 '(1 p) ?
1
p(1 p)
implying that all else held equal @x

@p ?
@xEU
@p .
4 Implications for the implementation of safety
So far, we have studied care and risk-sharing policies by a benevolent planner,
who can directly implement both of them. In the following, we extend the
analysis to consider whether these two objectives can be reached by means of
ordinary policy instruments, such as regulation, insurance, and tort liability.
4.1 Simple regulation schemes
The results of propositions 1 to 8 suggest that the e¢ cient allocation of wealth
is not linear, in the sense that an increase in societys wealth does not result
in a proportional change in the individualswealth. The specic shape of this
relationship depends on the curvature of individual utility functions and on the
safety technology. However, for practical purposes, e¤ective insurance policies,
regulation or liability ought to be simple enough to be implemented. In this
section, we show that it is possible to reach the rst best by using simple linear
rules governing the level of care and how the harm and the cost of care are
shared between the parties.
Consider a simple sharing rule for both the harm and the cost of care, such
that the injurer bears an amount h(x) of the harm and an amount x of the
cost of care. Focusing directly on the comonotonic case, the social problem
consists of nding (; ; X) that maximize:
SW = (1  '(1  p))u(w0   h(x)  x) + '(1  p)u(w0   x)
+ (1  '(1  p)) v(y0   (1  )h(x)  (1  )x) + '(1  p)v(y0   (1  )x)
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Ignoring the arguments of the utility functions, the rst-order conditions
yield:
u0(wb) = v0(yb) (19)
(1  '(1  p))u0(wb) + '(1  p)u0(wg) = (1  '(1  p)) v0(yb) + '(1  p)v0(g)
(20)
(1  '(1  p))h0(X) + 1 = ' (1  p)

1  v
0(yg)
v0(yb)

(21)
with wb = w0   h(x)   x, wg = w0   x, yb = y0   (1   )h(x)   (1   )x
and yg = y0  (1 )x. Note that (19) requires that marginal utilities of victim
and injurer in the bad state be equal; combining (19) and (20) we have also
that the marginal utilities of victim and injurer in the good state should be
equal: u0(b) = v0(g), which satises Borchs conditions, yielding in turn that the
allocation of risk is the same as in the rst-best. Likewise, (21) is the same as
(9), yielding that the level of care is also the same as in the rst best, X = x.
This result should not be surprising, since it is due to the fact that there are as
many independent instruments as variables to control: X controls care, while
 and  control the allocation of risk in the good and the bad state.
The solution just described may also be implemented through a mix of reg-
ulation and lump-sum transfers. Regulation sets and enforces the required level
of care, while taxes and subsidies realize the desired transfers of wealth between
the parties in each state. To illustrate, assume that the injurer pays both the
cost of care and the accident loss, while the victim pays two di¤erent lump-sum
taxes  b in the bad state and g in the good state, which are used to subsidize
the injurer. Regulation has the task to enforce the level of care X = x. Assum-
ing that this goal is achieved by means of nes or other forms of punishment for
violators, then the e¢ cient choice of ( b; g) by the planner maximizes (once
more, considering only the comonotonic case):
SW = (1  '(1  p))u(w0   h(x)  x +  b) + '(1  p)u(w0   x + g)
+ (1  '(1  p)) v(y0    b) + '(1  p)v(y0   g)
and thus, the optimal values of (b ; 

g) satisfy:
u0(w0   h(x)  x + b) = v0(y0   b)
u0(w0   x + g) = v0(y0   g)
which have the same form as Borchs conditions.
4.2 Tort laws and liability rules
In this context of unilateral prevention, we focus on two simple rules; strict
liability and negligence, and discuss how private insurance improve the situation.
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4.2.1 Tort law and moral constraints
In our companion paper (Dari-Mattiacci and Langlais (2009)), we characterized
a second best (Pareto-constrained) situation as one in which one party obtains
full insurance against accidents (i.e. receives the same wealth, irrespective of
the state of the world that materializes). We labelled this situation as a second-
best outcome since we showed that in the rst best both parties should bear
some risk. Fairness for example may be a justication that innocent victims do
not su¤er any reduction in their wealth as a consequence of accidents that they
were not in a position to avoid.
One case with full insurance for the victim obtains when y = y0, that is,
the victim is guaranteed its initial level of wealth in all states. But we are
allowed to consider the general situation in which y > 0 is arbitrarily set. This
encompasses both the case where y > y0 and the case where y < y0: thus,
the victims wealth is constant across states yb = yg = y but might be either
greater or less than his initial wealth. Accordingly to this Pareto-constrained
solution, the injurer obtains wb = W0   y   x   h(x), in the bad state, and
wg =W0   y   x, in the good state.
Considering such constraints, there is no guarantee that the Borch conditions
in proposition 1 are satised. However, such an allocation of risk enable the
planer to transfer the full burden of the costs of the accident, including the risk,
to the injurer. The problem of the social planer reduces to the maximization of:
(1  '(1  p))u(W0   y   h(x)  x) + '(1  p)u(W0   y   x)
and leads the injurers level of care, xy, to satisfy the following rst order con-
dition:
  (1  '(1  p))h0(xy) + '(1  p)

1  u
0(W0   y   xy)
u0(W0   y   h(xy)  xy)

= 1 (22)
Condition (22) has the same general frame as (9) excepted that Borch con-
ditions do not hold a priori 11 . This means that the second best level of care
depends on12 the aggregate wealth, the probability of accident, the character-
istic of the technology of care, and so interestingly, the injurers pessimism and
risk aversion.
There are several reasons why rms may act as if they were risk-averse. Ba-
sic justications refer to factors such as non-diversied ownership, the existence
of liquidity constraints or the risk of bankruptcy and costly nancial distress,
and non-linear tax systems (Baron (1971), Leland (1972), Sandmo (1971)). In
these cases, the argument is a technical one: although the rm utility index is
linear in its prot (constant marginal utility), the constraints coming from the
limited ability to spread risk or from the tax system, introduce a non linear-
ity (concavity) in its objective - leading to risk averse decisions by the rms.
11Excepted by chances.
12 It is easy to verify that the resulting second-best level of care has most of the characteristics
found for the rst best.
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Other reasons are linked to the delegation of control to a risk-averse manager,
whose pay is linked to rm performance, which may also cause a rm to behave
in a risk-averse manner: thus, the preferences of the manager are substituted
with the preferences of the rm. Finally, it has been shown by Adellaoui and
Munier (1997) that the specic pattern of behavior under risk captured by the
RDEU assumption is observed in the area of industrial activities associated to
potential major accidents, since employees including highly graduated or skilled
ones (engineers, technicians) of chemical or nuclear plants exhibited a tendency
to underestimate the probability of accident, leading them to undertake lower
e¤orts of precaution than needed.
The next issue is: what are consequences of imperfect risk sharing for the
setting of safety activities? We are allowed to prove the next result, where
( ~wb; ~wg; ~yb; ~yg) denotes the rst best allocation, while (wb; wg; y; y) denotes the
second best one:
Proposition 11 The second best level of care may be smaller or larger than
the rst best one. A/ More specically, the second best care level is larger than
the rst best, either: i) if y < ~yb and if the injurer is IARA; or ii) if y > ~yg and
if the injurer is DARA. B/ Finally, if y 2]~yb; ~yg[, the two levels of care are not
directly comparable.
Proof. Let us dene the function s(k)  u0(g+k)u0(b+k) where g > b; then if
the injurer is DARA, s(k) is increasing, while if the injurer is IARA, s(k) is
decreasing. This is straightforward since:
s0(k)  u
0(g + k)
u0(b+ k)

 u
00(b+ k)
u0(b+ k)

 

 u
00(g + k)
u0(g + k)

and thus: sign [s0(k)] = sign
h
 u00(b+k)u0(b+k)

 

 u00(g+k)u0(g+k)
i
.
By denition, the rst best requires the sharing of the total cost of accident
by both parties (each one bears a part of the aggregate risk, according to the
Mutuality Principle), and satises ~yb < ~yg and ~wb =W0  ~yb h(x) x < ~wg =
W0  ~yg x. In contrast, should the planner adheres to moral considerations, the
second best corresponds to an allocation where yb = yg but wb =W0 y h(x) 
x < wg =W0 y x. By concavity of u, we also have: u
0( ~wg)
u0( ~wb)
> u
0(W0 ~yb x)
u0(W0 ~yb h(x) x)
and u
0( ~wg)
u0( ~wb)
>
u0(W0 ~yg x)
u0(W0 ~yg h(x) x) .
Consider two cases:
i) Let us dene now as: y = ~yb  k. It comes that if the injurer is IARA, we
obtain: u
0( ~wg)
u0( ~wb)
> u
0(W0 ~yb x)
u0(W0 ~yb h(x) x) >
u0(W0 ~yb+k x)
u0(W0 ~yb+k h(x) x) .
Hence, by continuity, for any feasible y < ~yb we have under IARA:
u0( ~wg)
u0( ~wb)
>
u0(W0 y x)
u0(W0 y h(x) x) . As a result, it comes that: '(1   p)

1  u0( ~wg)u0( ~wb)

< '(1  
p)

1  u0(W0 y x)u0(W0 y h(x) x)

; hence, the LHS in (9) is smaller than the LHS in
(22), and nally this implies: x < xy.
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ii) Let us now dene as: y = ~yg+k. It comes that if the injurer is DARA, we
obtain: u
0( ~wg)
u0( ~wb)
>
u0(W0 ~yg x)
u0(W0 ~yg h(x) x) >
u0(W0 ~yg k x)
u0(W0 ~yg k h(x) x) . Hence, by continuity,
for any feasible y > ~yg we have under DARA:
u0( ~wg)
u0( ~wb)
> u
0(W0 y x)
u0(W0 y h(x) x) . As a
result, we have: '(1 p)

1  u0( ~wg)u0( ~wb)

< '(1 p)

1  u0(W0 y x)u0(W0 y h(x) x)

; hence,
the LHS in (9) is still smaller than the LHS in (22), and nally it comes also
that: x < xy.
The main consequence of these results is that the second best care level is
set according to the variation of the injurers risk aversion index with wealth.
Proposition 11 contrasts two specic cases. In the rst one: y < ~yb, the endow-
ment of the victim deteriorates as compared to the worst event at rst best 
although he obtains a constant wealth, non contingent to the state of the na-
ture. Then, the share of the aggregate risk (i.e. wealth) borne by the injurer
increases: as a result, as far as the injurer is IARA, this must be compensated
by a higher level of care. In the second one, y > ~yg, the endowment of the victim
is improved as compared to the best event at rst best; thus, the share of the ag-
gregate wealth borne by the injurer now decreases: thus, under the assumption
that the injurer is DARA, this also requires that more care be undertaken.13
4.2.2 Strict liability
We now turn to liability rules, which are alternative tools to reallocate wealth
and give incentives to take care. An important result of the previous analysis is
that the rst best requires enough instruments to reallocate wealth across states.
However, liability rules allow transfers between the injurer and the victim in the
bad state in the form of damages payments while ruling out any payment in
the good state. Thus, it may be expected that liability falls short of controlling
all of the three variables pertaining to risk-sharing and care and hence will not
be enough to implement the rst best. In the following we also compare the
performance of liability rules to the second best.
Consider rst strict liability: the injurer pays damages equal to h(x) when-
ever an accident occurs, where  > 0. With  = 1, the injurer pays perfectly
compensatory damages to the victim the victims obtains full compensation for
his pecuniary losses and, thus, has a constant wealth across states yb = yg = y0.
However, strict liability can also be designed as to allow for supracompensatory
damages ( > 1, such as punitive damages) or infracompensatory ( < 1)
damages, in which cases the victim receives a state-dependent wealth which is
y0 + (  1)h(x) in the bad state, and y0 in the good state.
Proposition 12 Under strict liability with perfect compensatory damages  =
1, the injurer chooses a second-best level of care. The associated allocation of risk
13Typically, under IARA (DARA), the injurer is less (more) prone to undertake risk when
he becomes reacher (see Pratt (1964))
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is also second best. If damages are infra- or supracompensatory, the outcome is
neither a rst best nor a second best.
Proof. Assume that the liability rule is strict liability:  = 1. Under this
liability rule, the injurer will take care as to maximize:
(1  '(1  p))u(w0   h(x)  x) + '(1  p)u(w0   x)
Let x denote the injurers level of care, which satises the following rst
order condition:
  (1  '(1  p))h0(x) + '(1  p)

1  u
0(w0   x)
u0(w0   h(x)  x)

= 1
Thus, when  = 1 the injurers choice of care is the same as in the second
best in (22). The wealth of the victim is thus the constant allocation y = y0
which provides him with full insurance. Hence,  = 1 allows to implement the
second best both in terms of care and of risk.
When  6= 1, x does not meet the condition for a second best level of care.
Moreover, such a liability rule generally does reach neither a rst best nor a
second best allocation of risk. With supracompensatory damages, the victim re-
ceives a greater wealth in the bad state than in the good state: y0+( 1)h(x) >
y0 = yg, implying that the associated allocation of risk is not comonotonic, hence
it cannot be rst-best e¢ cient. In contrast, with infracompensatory damages
we have y0 + (   1)h(x) < y0; then, the allocation is comonotonic but it will
be only by chance that Borchs conditions are met; moreover care is not set at
the rst-best level.
From this proposition it emerges that increasing or decreasing the damage
amount a¤ects both the level of care and the sharing of the risk, bringing the
outcome away from the second best (but possibly improving over it), without
being able to reach the rst best.
4.2.3 Negligence
Under the negligence rule, the injurer pays damages only if negligent, that is if
his level of care is below X. Here the only policy instrument is the due care
level X. In fact, if the injurer abides by the standard of care, he does not pay
damages to the victim, thus  becomes irrelevant as concerns the allocation of
risk.
However, the parameter  is important in respect of the question of incentive
compatibility. When the standard of care is set at the level X, the utility level
of the injurer is dened as:
U(w0; x) =

u(w0   x) if x  X
(1  '(1  p))u(w0   h(x)  x) + '(1  p)u(w0   x) otherwise
(23)
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As a result, under the negligence rule, the injurer obtains a sure outcome
(w0  X) if he adheres to the due care standard, and a risky outcome (p; w0  
h(x)  x; 1  p; w0   x) if he does not. Note that according to the rst line of
(23), the injurer has no incentives to choose x > X. According to the second
line of (23), when he does not comply with X, the injurer chooses the same level
of care as under strict liability; x denotes this level of care.
Thus, negligence raises two issues: Will the injurer comply with the due
care? Assuming he does, how does the outcome compare with the rst and
second best? In our companion paper, we dened a dual second best, as one for
which the injurer receives the same constant endowment across the states, and
thus, the victim bears the full aggregate risk.
Proposition 13 Under the negligence rule with a due care standard X:
i) If X  x, then the injurer complies with the due care standard;
ii) If X > x, then the injurer complies with the due care standard only if
the following condition is satised:
(1  '(1  p))u(w0   h(x)  x) + '(1  p)u(w0   x)
 u(w0  X) (24)
iii) The allocation of risk is generally not rst best. If the injurer complies,
the allocation of risk is dual second best.
Proof. i) If X  x, then: u(w0  h(x)  x)  u(w0  x)  u(w0 X)
which implies in turn:
pu(w0   h(x)  x) + (1  p)u(w0   x)
 (1  '(1  p))u(w0   x) + '(1  p)u(w0   x)
 (1  '(1  p))u(w0  X) + '(1  p)u(w0  X)
= u(w0  X)
Thus, the injurer complies with due care.
ii) if X > x, then:
u(w0   x)
= (1  '(1  p))u(w0   x) + '(1  p)u(w0   x)
 (1  '(1  p))u(w0  X) + '(1  p)u(w0  X)
= u(w0  X)
but condition (24) is not always satised. In several cases, the injurer may
prefer to be found liable and bear the loss rather than comply with the due care
standard.
iii) When the injurer complies, the victim is not compensated for his loss.
The injurer only bears the cost of care and does not face any risk. This outcome
is the dual of the second best described above, where the victim did not face
any risk.
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According to proposition 11, note that the results also apply when the stan-
dard isX = x. However, given the costs allocation associated to the negligence,
the outcome in terms of risk sharing can never be rst best. But it is easy to see
that whatever the standard X, the injurer complies as far as it entails a risk re-
duction as compared to not complying. This requirement is obviously met once
we have X  x; hence, the rst best in term of prevention may be obtained if
X = x  x. In contrast, by setting X = x and  = 1, the planner can reach
for sure the second-best level of care X = xy . Concerning the allocation of risk,
note the negligence rule implements a second-best allocation of risk where the
injurer, rather than the victim, is fully insured. Finally, the level of care that is
second best when the injurer is fully insured can be reached provided that the
incentive-compatibility conditions set in the proposition above are satised.
4.3 Does insurance improve the situation?
We now consider the issue of liability and insurance combined. For the sake of
simplicity, we only introduce perfect compensatory damages ( = 1). Assume
now that the injurer has the opportunity to buy third-party liability insurance
in a competitive insurance market and that the insurer can cheaply control the
injurers level of care. In a private insurance market, insurers charge a premium:
m = (1 + )tph(x), with a loading factor   0 reecting the existence of
administrative costs in the insurance sector, and pay an indemnity in case of
accident q = th(x) where t 2 [0; 1].
Under strict liability, the amount of insurance coverage and the level of care
chosen by the injurer are the solution to the maximization of:
U(t) =

(1  '(1  p))u(wb) + '(1  p)u(wg) if q  h(x)
'(p)u(wb) + (1  '(p))u(wg) if q > h(x)
dening as wb = w0   h(x) + q   x m and wg = w0   x m. Note that:
U 0(t) =

(1  '(1  p)) (1  (1 + )p)u0(wb)  '(1  p)(1 + )pu0(wg) if q  h(x)
'(p)(1  (1 + )p)u0(wb)  (1  '(p))(1 + )pu0(wg) if q > h(x)
(25)
and that for t 2]0; 1[, the equilibrium level of care x satises14 :
  (1  '(1  p))h0(x) [(1  t) + (1 + )pt]+'(1 p)

1  u
0(wg)
u0(wb)
[1 + (1 + )pth0(x)]

= 1
(26)
The main results are the following:
14For an interior solution x > 0.
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Proposition 14 Assume that liability coverage is o¤ered in a private insurance
market. Then, strict liability with perfect compensatory damage generally does
not yield the rst-best. More specically:
A) The injurer demands full insurance if  2
h
'(p)
p   1; 1 '(1 p)p   1
i
; more-
over i) if  2
i
0; 1 '(1 p)p   1
i
, he produces a level of care higher than the risk
neutral one; ii) in contrast if  2
h
'(p)
p   1; 0
i
, he produces a level of care
smaller than the rst best one.
B) The injurer demands a partial insurance contract if  > 1 '(1 p)p   1; i)
moreover if  > 1 pp , he undertakes an e¤ort which is higher than the rst best;
but if  < 1 pp , he undertakes an e¤ort which may be higher or smaller than the
rst best.
Proof. A) It has been demonstrated in the case without care (see Dupuis
and Langlais (1997)), that for RDEU agents full insurance (t = 1) is optimal
in a range of the loading factor  requiring low enough values (both positive
and negative)15 . The same result also holds with we consider safety activities;
if  satises: 1 '(1 p)'(1 p)  (1+)p1 (1+)p  '(p)1 '(p) , 1 '(1 p)p   1    '(p)p   1,
the injurer will buy full insurance t = 1 , q = h(x). To see this, remark that
according to (25) expressed at t = 1, we have that t = 1 is the best insurance
decision for the injurer as long as:
U 0(1) =

(1  '(1  p)) (1  (1 + )p)  '(1  p)(1 + )p > 0
'(p)(1  (1 + )p)  (1  '(p))(1 + )p < 0
Then, the upper line means that as long as 1 '(1 p)'(1 p)  (1+)p1 (1+)p , 1 '(1 p)p  
1  , then the injurer has no incentives to reduce his insurance coverage,
and thus full insurance is still individually optimal; the bottom line in contrast
implies that as long as (1+)p1 (1+)p  '(p)1 '(p) ,   '(p)p   1, then the injurer has
no incentives to increase his insurance coverage (should he have the opportunity
to obtain over insurance), and thus full insurance stays individually optimal.
As a result, when t = 1 (for which wb = wg and thus u0(wb) = u0(wg)),
condition (26) becomes:
 ph0(x)(1 + ) = 1 (27)
to be compared with the rst best given by (9), and to the risk-free case given
by (1). It is thus straightforward that for (small but) positive values of the
loading factor, 1 '(1 p)p   1   > 0, then x > x^ but x 7 x; on the other
hand, for (small but) negative values of , 0 >   '(p)p   1, then x < x^ and
hence x < x. Finally, for  = 0, then we obtain x = x^ < x.
15 In contrast, Mossin (1968) rst established that a risk averse EU individual does not buy
a full insurance contract, unless  = 0, which is the unique value for which it is optimal that
t = 1.
29
B) In contrast, for large enough values of  satisfying  > 1 '(1 p)p  1, then
following (25), the injurer will buy partial insurance t < 1 , q < h(x) such
that:
(1  '(1  p)) (1  (1 + )p)u0(wb)  '(1  p)(1 + )pu0(wg) = 0
In this case, the level of care attained will satisfy the general expression of
(25) with wb < wg. Thus, generally speaking, there is no obvious ranking of
x against x^ or x. In order to make explicit the comparison with (9), let us
rewrite (26) as:
  (1  '(1  p))h0(x) + '(1  p)

1  u
0(wg)
u0(wb)

  (1  '(1  p))h0(x)t [(1 + )p  1]  (1 + )pth0(x)'(1  p)u
0(wg)
u0(wb)
= 1 (28)
Remark that setting t = 0, then (28) writes as (9). The fourth LHS term
in (28) is positive; the third one is positive as far as (1 + )p > 1 ,  >
1 p
p

> 1 '(1 p)p   1

. Then if  > 1 pp , the level of care is higher than the
rst best one: x > x. In contrast, when  < 1 pp , the level of care may be
higher or smaller than the rst best one.
Note that the threshold loading factor 1 '(1 p)p   1 is positive, given the
convexity of '; in contrast the threshold '(p)p   1 is negative, reecting that
subsidizes to insurance. The reason behind this last proposition is that in-
surance markets allow the injurer to individually reallocate his wealth among
di¤erent states of the nature, in such a way that his marginal utility of wealth
be equal between states. Nevertheless, this does not represent a Pareto e¢ cient
allocation, since according to Borchs conditions, the rst best allocation of risk
is only obtained through transfers between individuals, state by state, in order
that individual marginal utilities equate in each separate state. As a result,
the decentralization of the choice for the prevention activity leads the injurer to
nally invest in care depending only on his own situation and characteristics.
Consider now the simple negligence when the standard of care (and perfect
compensatory damages) is set at the level X. If the injurer has the opportunity
to buy liability insurance, his utility level is dened as:8<: u(w0  X) if x  XU(t) =  (1  '(1  p))u(wb) + '(1  p)u(wg) if q  h(x)
'(p)u(wb) + (1  '(p))u(wg) if q > h(x) and if x < X
where wb; wg have been dened previously. The result is straightforward.
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Proposition 15 Assume that liability coverage is o¤ered in a private insurance
market. Then, under the negligence rule with a standard of care X:
i) The injurer complies with any standard of care X  x^ and buys no insur-
ance if  2
i
0; 1 '(1 p)p   1
i
.
ii) The injurer complies with a standard of care X = x and buys no insur-
ance if  2
i
0; 1 '(1 p)p   1
i
and: x   x < (1 + )ph(x).
iii) The injurer complies with any standard of care X  x and buys no
insurance if  2
h
'(p)
p   1; 0
i
and: X   x < (1 + )ph(x).
iv) The injurer complies with any standard X and buys no insurance if  >
1 '(1 p)
p   1 and: u(w  X) > (1  '(1  p))u(wb) + '(1  p)u(wg).
Proof. The injurer complies to X if we have generally: u(w0  X) < U(t).
The injurer needs insurance coverage only when he expects to be found liable.
In this case, we are back to the strict liability rule.
Consider rst the situation where  2
i
0; 1 '(1 p)p   1
i
which implies full
insurance. i) Facing a standard X  x^, if the injurer does not comply, he
chooses a level of care x < x^. Since u(w0  X)  u(w0   x^) > u(w0   x) >
u(w0   x   (1 + )ph(x)), the result i) follows.
ii) Facing a standard X = x, if the injurer does not comply, he chooses a
level of care x 7 x. If u(w0 x) > u(w0 x   (1+ )ph(x))() x x <
(1 + )ph(x), the result ii) follows.
Consider the situation now where  2
i
0; 1 '(1 p)p   1
i
also associated to
full insurance.
iii) If the standard is set at X  x, and if the insurer do not comply, he
chooses x  x^. Then, if u(w0   X) > u(w0   x   (1 + )ph(x)), the result
iii) follows.
Proposition 15 shows that when insurance markets are imperfect, negligence
may allow to implement di¤erent care levels, depending on the combination
between a standard X and a tari¤ of insurance . Case i) shows that the injurer
may comply to a small standard of care when insurers charge not too high premia
(such that the injurer has the opportunity to buy full coverage for liability
insurance). Case ii) shows that the injurer may not comply to a standard set
at the rst best level of care, unless its cost is smaller than the expected cost
associated to safety and a full insurance contract. Case iii) displays a situation
where the injurer complies to a high standard of safety (larger than the st best
one), although liability insurance is subsidized; compliance occurs as far as the
cost of this high standard is smaller than the expected cost associated to non
compliance and full insurance. Finally case iv) means that when the injurer
cannot obtain but incomplete (partial) liability insurance, he is likely to comply
to any standard set as low as possible.
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5 Conclusion
The aim of the paper was to revisit the unilateral accident model, taking into
account for the limited opportunities of risk spreading when aggregate losses
exist in the specic cases of major industrial accidents. Typically, theses ones
correspond to a situation of small probability/large (catastrophic) damages, for
which it is well known that individuals display behavioral biases in the percep-
tion of the risk. As a result, it is well documented that insurance markets may
experience serious failures. When insurance coverage is available, companies
charge high levels of premium, and o¤er indemnity schedules which are charac-
terized by both deductibles on small losses and caps and upper limits on large
ones. Typically, when an insurance demand exist, it is heavily constrained and
full insurance is not possible.
Two salient results have been obtained in such circumstances. First, we
characterized the rst best outcome of such an economy (assuming RDEU rep-
resentation of preferences) both in terms of risk sharing and care level, and
showed that the choice of the safety investment decision corresponds to a higher
level of care than in a risk-free/risk-neutral economy. Second, we proved that
in contrast to recent papers, the implementation of safety through tort law may
at best allow to reach a second best outcome, even when markets insurance
are introduced. Moreover, negligence does not always lead to a better situation
than strict liability.
Our results show that not only pessimism is important for the analysis of the
functioning of tort law, but the specic assumption regarding individual prefer-
ences and the specic denition of pessimism is important: in our framework,
pessimism leads to results which are the opposite of Teitelbaum (2007)s ones.
Coming back to the general shape of the probability transformation function in
graph 1, it is obvious that our analysis may be extended to such a case, although
additional but technical di¢ culties should occur. More specically, depending
on the intervalle to which baseline risk p pertains, a richer comparative statics
analysis should be obtained. However, note that our results are robust to the
extent that p is in the domain of small probabilities such as p0 for which the
probability distortion is still convex: this is because locally, the distortion is
pessimistic and thus the subjective likelihood of accident will be larger than the
probability of accident. In contrast, considering the domain of marger probabil-
ities such as p1 for which the probability distortion is now concave, it comes that
locally, the distortion is optimistic and thus the subjective likelihood of accident
will be smaller than the probability of accident, which may reverse some of our
results. This is left for future researches.
A typical extension of our work is also to take into account for the hetero-
geneity in individuals risk perceptions. Another line of research is the issue
of the optimal mix of ex ante regulation and ex post liability for highly risky
activities.
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Appendix
Assume a decision maker having preferences which satisfy the RDEU ax-
iomatic; then, there exists two functions:
- a probability transformation ' : [0; 1]  [0; 1] ! [0; 1] unique, continuous
and increasing in p, with '(0) = 0 and '(1) = 1,
- and a utility index u, increasing (unique up to a a¢ ne transformation),
such that facing a risky prospect X = (x1; 1   p;x2; p), with x1 < x2, then
his satisfaction level is :
V (X)  ('(Pr ob(X  x1))  ' (Pr ob(X > x1))) v(x1)
+ ('(Pr ob(X  x2))  ' (Pr ob(X > x2))) v(x2)
 (1  ' (p)) v(x1) + ' (p) v(x2)
It is well known that two di¤erent denitions for the concept of risk aversion,
namely:
- risk aversion in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz aversion to a mean-
preserving spread of risk, which allows tocompare two risky situations, di¤ering
according to the second stochastic dominance order;
- risk aversion in the sense of Arrow and Pratt prefering the certainty of
the expected gamble to the gamble, we compare certainty to a risky outcome,
are both characterized by the concavity of the utility index in the Expected
Utility model. In contrast, in the RDEU framework, risk aversion in the sense
of Rothschild and Stiglitz is equivalent to ' convex and u concave (Chew and
ali (1990)): this is a concept of strong aversion to risk (Cohen (1995)), that
is aversion to marginal shifts in risk. In contrast, risk aversion in the sense of
Arrow and Pratt does not necessarily require that u be concave, as far as ' is
su¢ ciently convex (Chateauneuf and Cohen (1994)): this is a concept of weak
risk aversion, or aversion to a global increase in risk.
In the literature, the convexity of ' is also associated to a behavior termed
probabilistic risk aversion (litteraly: aversion to probability mixtures) or strong
pessimism (Roël (1987), Wakker (1994), Yaari (1987)).
The consequence of the convexity of ' together with the conditions '(0) =
0 and '(1) = 1, is that ' (q) < q for all q 2 [0; 1]. Thus, the way a risk
averse decision maker evaluates the prospect X in the RDEU model implies
that 1   ' (p) > 1   p: he over estimates the probability of the smaller gain
1  p, and ' (p) < p, he under estimates the probability of the larger one p.
38
